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Introducing performativity to crisis management theory: An illustration from the 
2003 French heat wave crisis response 
Abstract 
This paper draws on theories of performativity to enrich our understanding of crisis dynamics 
and crisis management. While the current crisis management literature focuses on the 
necessity of consistent data and shared interpretation to coordinate effectively, our research 
suggests that to the contrary, in crisis response, efficient information transmission and 
federating sensemaking are hardly achievable and do not always support crisis response. By 
drawing on the concept of performativity, we completed an interpretive analysis of the 2003 
French heat wave crisis response. Our findings unveil the influence of crisis responders’ 
performance during crisis response, either as positive or negative catalysts for crisis response. 
Performing in crisis response can support immediate reaction and involvement, but can also 
generate conflicts, or misunderstandings that can burden coordination.The contribution of this 
work is threefold. First of all, we enrich the crisis management literature by suggesting 
performativity as a potential analysis grid of collective action during crisis response. 
Secondly, we propose some practical directions to benefit from the concept of performativity 
in crisis training. Finally, we propose a critical perspective on tacitly hedl assumpltions in 
crisis management. 
Key-words: Crisis management, 2003 French heat wave, Performativity. 
Introduction 
This paper proposes performativity as a conceptual lens to enrich understanding of the 
influence of crisis responders’ behaviors on coordination during crisis response.  
In disaster settings, implicit adjustments from coordination standards, if not coordination 
breakdowns, are likely to occur (Van Veelen, Storms and Van Aart, 2006; Ren, Kiesler and 
Fussell, 2008). Thus scholars commonly agree that interactions play a crucial role in 
organizations’ coping with environmental threats and organizational dysfunctions (Gonzalez, 
2008). It is often presupposed that to meet with an unstable situation, crisis responders have to 
develop a common understanding of the situation and share information effectively. In line 
with this reasoning, the crisis management literature has provided significant efforts to 
identify good practices and technological resources to ease information transmission (Mitroff, 
Pearson and Harrington, 1996; Pearson, Misra, Claire and Mitroff, 1997; Jefferson, 2006). 
However, settling a commonly shared picture of the crisis situation can be difficult to achieve. 
Informational gaps are likely to occur, generating enough confusion to obstacle crisis 
response (Billings, Milburn and Schaalman, 1980; Milburn, Schuler and Watman, 1983b; 
Weick, 1988;1993; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). In addition, sharing a common interpretation 
of the situation can suffer from crisis responders’ emotional state, distractions and conflicts 
(Ren et al., 2008), or can lead to cultural entrapment (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003). Thus our 
paper addresses the following question: When efficient information transmission and shared 
sensemaking do not occur, how to account for coordination in crisis response?  
The 2003 French heat wave crisis response offers a vivid illustration of coordination 
despite lacking information (Lagadec, 2004; Salagnac, 2007). and divergent interpretation and 
narratives. Our analysis of the 2003 French heat waveDuring the summer of 2003, 14,802 
people died in France from hyperthermia, Most victims were elderlies living in urban regions. 
Within the organizations involved with the crisis, individuals developed divergent perceptions 
of the gravity of the situation. In addition, they  
To account for coordination in the 2003 French heat wave crisis respone, we propose an 
alternative crisis management framework based on the concept of performativity (Denzin, 
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2003a). Performativity was extensively used as an analysis grid in philosophy (Lyotard, 1979; 
Barad, 2003), economics (Merton, 1948) and research in management (Parker and Kosoksky 
Sedgwick, 1995; Sweetser, 2001; Hodgson, 2005). Organizational members are both actors 
and spectators of performances. They perform changes and justifications, interpretations and 
judgements, while being both sincere and theatrical, rational and emotional. Information 
transmission is thus shaped by performative characteristics and behaviors that are watched as 
performances. 
This study is explorative and interpretive. We coded three sources of data, e.g. public 
hearing, interviews, archives, that were previously reduced and triangulated. Our findings 
reveal that coordination did not solely depend on information transmission or individuals’ 
ability to share meanings. The 2003 French heat wave crisis responders performed by mainly 
endorsing roles, showing off their professionalism and incarnating emotions. By developing 
communication strategies, crisis responders contributed to immediate action. However, their 
performances also played the role of an additional cognitive filter that aggravated conflicts 
and misunderstandings. Two intrinsic features of performativity can be observed in the 
interactions between the 2003 French heat wave crisis responders. First, the crisis responders’ 
performance was not directed towards an efficient action but fueled on impression, 
interactions and personal approach to organizational politics. Second, alternating between the 
roles of an actor and a spectator, crisis responders were more likely to base their decisions off 
of an interpretation of others’ performances rather than a univocal meaning or a single source 
of information. 
This work is structured as follows. The first section presents our theoretical background 
in two parts: We first provide a review of approaches to information tranmission found in 
crisis management literature and then introduce our approach based on the concept of 
performance. The second section presents our methodology and then the third section presents 
a chronology of the 2003 French heat wave. The fourth section details our understanding of 
the communication that took place during the 2003 French heat wave from a performative 
perspective. More specifically, we detail crisis responders’ performance through the narration 
of five episodes that played the role of milestones in crisis response. The final sections of the 
paper are devoted to the discussion of the findings and the contribution of this work. 
Our contribution to the crisis management literature is three-fold. First of all, we provide 
additional insights on coordination in crisis response. Our work highlights the subtle role of 
the performance of emotions and professionalism on coordination in crisis response. While 
empathy can support individuals’ involvement, emotions can also aggravate conflicts. In 
addition, our analysis demonstrates that the inherent duality of performance, e.g. the roles of 
an actor and a spectator, influenced the way crisis responders’ mobilized and commited into 
crisis response. Furthermore, we discuss the contribution of the concept of performativity to 
the crisis management literature. The performative lenses help shed light on phenomena that 
would remain paradoxical otherwise. Finally, we question three tacitly accepted assumptions 
in crisis management. 
Theoretical background 
Coordination, information transmission & sensemaking 
Numerous studies within crisis management literature investigate the factors that result in 
either the failure or success of a crisis response. In particular, the literature outlines the 
importance to optimize access to information and to support sense making. However, The 
2003 French heat wave illustrates a gap between empirical reality and this literature. In this 
section, we briefly review different perspectives on the factors of success and failure of a 
crisis response. We then explain this gap between these perspectives and the case under study. 
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Recently, crisis management scholars have demonstrated that access to updated sources 
of information can ease crisis response significantly. From a resource-based view, this stream 
of research has compared the pros and cons with respect to the use of technologies and 
management tools (Quarantelli, 1997; Turoff, 2002; Quarantelli, 2007). More specifically, 
scholars have been examining the extent that the Internet (Perry, Taylor and Doerfel, 2003), 
blogs (Sweetser and Metzgar, 2007), and social media (Plotnick and White, 2010) can 
practically support mobilization. Other studies focus on (Perry et al., 2003) phones (Brigham 
and Introna, 2006) and complex systems such as geo-collaborative tools (Cai, MacEachren, 
Sharma, Brewer, Fuhrmann and McNeese, 2005). Finally, growing efforts to design systems 
that support the Common Operational Picture (COP) by assembling diverse sources of data in 
a unified representation illustrates the strong need for information sharing in crisis response. 
However, more recent studies have raised criticism against this approach to crisis 
management. Not only are resources not always available (Dawes, Cresswell and Cahan, 
2004) but they also have a tendency to produce irrelevant pieces of information. Crisis 
responders can deviate from commonly-shared patterns of use and transmission of 
information when they need to be resilient (Rerup, 2001). Quarantelli’s claim that (1988: 
376), ‘the great number of possible combinations and contingencies necessitates that 
managers at times of emergencies be creative in devising the tactics to address them’ is 
particularly relevant when applied to information (Mendonça, Jefferson and Harrald, 2007; 
Palen, Hiltz and Liu, 2007). The production of a unified set of information hardly seem 
feasible, all the more as emotional pressure tends to burden information transmission (Singh, 
Singh, Park, Lee and Rao, 2009). In addition, the ability of crisis responders to coordinate 
with each other does not solely depend on information access and quality. Some authors are 
even concerned that technologies endanger an organization’s stability when a crisis strikes by 
virtually spreading collective psychose (Lagadec, 2009). Finally, technologies can fail at 
providing  information crucial to making sense of a critical situation (Boin, 2009). 
Echoing this criticism, a second stream of research shifts the focus from information 
transmission to the behavioral dimension of crisis response (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; 
Lanzara, 1983; Mendonça, Webb and Butts, 2010). From this perspective, crisis management 
relies on crisis responders’ ability to converge towards a commonly-shared interpretation. 
(Roux-Dufort and Vidaillet, 2003). In Weick’s in-depth investigation of the Mann Gulch 
highlights, when no more sense could be shared, the firefighters symbolically abandonned 
their professional identity. As a result, communication became difficult and coordination 
collapsed. One of the firefighters survived through improvisation by surrounding himself with 
a circle of burning grass. This example suggests that sensemaking to develop a shared 
interpretation, prior to information access and transmission, is the key to efficient crisis 
management (Weick and Roberts, 1993; Mills and Weatherbee, 2006; Mullen, Vladi and 
Mills, 2006). 
However, the absence of a shared meaning during crisis response can also have positive 
effects on its outcome. When crisis responders feel that the situation differs from the routine, 
they start sensing, braketting, and labeling (Weick et al., 2005). which makes crisis 
responders likely to develop multiple meanings (Steyer, Laroche and Jonczyk, 2010). Their 
defense of their own point of view and their struggle for meaning-making is a source of action 
(Hajer and Uitermark, 2008) that eventually promotes sensemaking renewal. It is true that 
without confronting various interpretations, organizations take the risk of remaining tied into 
a ‘cultural entrapment’, which burdens the development of adequate response to the critical 
situation, as in the Bristol Royal Infirmary case (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003). If significant 
details occur outside of the limited framework generated by these shared words, names, or 
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labels then the interdependent set of responders will not be able to access them till it is too 
late (Roux-Dufort, 2009; Weick, 2011). 
However, in a crisis situation such as the 2003 French heat wave, information 
transmission and sensemaking can be blocked, or at least considerably slowed down. In 2003 
the presence of death and suffering generated mixed feelings among crisis responders. In 
addition, organizational disparities among crisis responders strengthened the feeling of 
confusion. In this particular case, we believe that the concept of performativity offers 
additional insights on crisis response. 
From sensemaking to performance as a theoretical lens 
Sensemaking refers to interpreting cues, situations, and transforming them into words (Weick, 
2011). ‘Sensemaking involves turning circumstances into a situation that is comprehended 
explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard for action’ (Taylor & Van Every, 2000, 
p. 40). Meaning differs from the concept of sensemaking in that it refers either to a 
unequivocal signification attached to an event or to existential values (Sievers, 1986). 
Drawing on the example of a successful response started by a nurse that saved the life of a 
baby, Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005) acknowledge four prospective directions for 
future research to enrich the concept of sensemaking in crisis response. In particular, the 
authors point towards the connection between sensemaking and performance. 
A performance is the doing of an action that is intended to have an effect on those who 
witness it. A performance simultaneously involves being, doing and showing-doing 
(Schechner, 2002) and does not represent but unmediatedly presents (Schechner, 2002; 
Denzin, 2003b). In a performance, speaking, writing or moving do not intend to inform or 
create a common understanding but to have people consider other views, reflect, take actions 
and perform at their turn. What gets transmitted is not only informational or cognitive but also 
emotional, affective, embodied and situated. The performance blurs thinking and doing, 
interpreting and making, conceptualizing and creating, abstraction and embodiment 
(Conquergood, 2002). While sensemaking and performativity are related to each other, the 
two concepts contrast significantly in that they highlight different dynamics of interactions 
and communication during crisis response. The concept of performativity specifically 
enriches our understanding of crisis response in five essential ways. 
First of all, the concept of performativity helps us to understand situations in which 
sensemaking has not yet occurred. The literature on sensemaking has primarily investigated 
situations where individuals or groups converge (or not) towards a specific meaning. A 
performance is transformative, which means that performers constantly subvert or create 
additional senses rather than converging towards one or several meanings. 
Secondly, performance defines communication both as an action and as sense. In the 
sensemaking literature, sensemaking triggers actions (Weick and al., 2005), and the initiation 
of actions is a starting point for sensemaking (Weick, 1998). However, through performance, 
makes sense by communication, which can also be viewed as an action.  
Thirdly, performativity integrates verbal and non-verbal cues into the analysis of interactions. 
Throughout the sensemaking process, crisis responders translate their experiences into words, 
labels and frames. However, some cues may remain unnoticed or excluded from, 
sensemaking (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003). In a performance, words, labels and frames are only 
a small portion of what is communicated. Phrases, tones of voices, postures constitute a 
significant majority of the message as well as emotions, embodiment and tactile or olfactive 
properties of the message. 
Commentaire [A1]: Mettre la 
différence avec l’enactement 
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Fourthly, performativity is a heuristic concept in that a performance builds on immediate 
experience, readily accessible resources and the interaction of contrasting viewpoints. In other 
words, the outcome of a performance is continuously evolving and is dependant on the 
actions of those involved and the situation at hand. In this respect, performance differs from 
Corvellec and Riesberg’s concept of mise-en-sens (2007), which also draws upon a theatrical 
metaphor, but where one dominant sense is staged in order to be sold to multiple stakeholders. 
The concept of sensemaking draws from a collective body of past sensemakings (Weick, 
1979) where as performance builds as on “open work” (Eco, 1989) from ongoing interactions, 
actions and myths. 
Finally, performativity takes into account the dynamics of power and hierarchy. Sensemaking 
takes place in the form of a metaphorical conversation between members, during which power 
relationships are rarely established. From the perspective of performativity, to the contrary, 
the performer plays his hierarchical role and the spectator’s interpretation of the situation is 
from the beginning imprinted by hierarchical positions and power games. In addition, a 
performance involves conventions about interpreting rules, where power, hierarchies and 
positions are pervasive (Rancière, 2004). During times of crisis, improvisations and behaviors 
diverging from the expected role being performed are intrinsic parts of the overall 
performance. 
To conclude, the concept of performativity provides an excellent opportunity to explore 
interactions in crisis response. 
Methodology 
Our study is exploratory and, for this reason, followed a qualitative design. Data 
collection covered three main sources: public hearings, interviews and archives. The public 
hearings were committed to the parliamentary chambers because “the public institutions lack 
of involvement had been alarming” (Evin, 2004). These hearings consisted of more than 100 
hours of public collective interviewing completed in the aftermath of the heat wave by 
members of two investigation commissions. We completed 13 semi-structured retrospetive 
interviews. Archives were composed of internal resources that correspond to the documents 
that the heat wave crisis responders exchanged, ranging from emails to press releases drafts. 
We also gathered external archives under the form of essays, academic works, reports and 
newspapers’ documentation on the crisis response to the 2003 French heat wave. Given the 
important amount of archives related to the 2003 French heat wave, we had to select archival 
data on the basis of their proximity with the topic of research and their reliability. To handle 
proximity, we retained documents that dealt with the core of our topics and documents that 
provided contextual data. While the former documents referred to sources of data that dealt 
with coordination issues within the Parisian health network, the latter type of document 
depicted the organizational settings and the health care system functioning. Archives also 
differed in terms of scientific reliability: some were scientific studies, which conducted us to 
retain these studies as sources of secondary data (Thiétart, 2007). We treated documents that 
were not supported by any methodology as testimonies and coded these documents as primary 
data. opinions. Finally, we analyzed official reports, even though they offer less rigorous 
methodologies and coded the emails, internal notes, public interviews that they contained. 
To support the reliability of our findings, we completed data triangulation on both primary 
and secondary data. Appendice A provides an illustration of the triangulation process. 
However, the coding focused on primary sources of data, e.g. emails, faxes, retrospective 
interviews and public hearings. Given the important amount of data to analyze, we had to 
complete a data reduction by following a theme dictionary (Thiétart, 2007). Appendice B 
presents the theme dictionaries used for data reduction. 
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Data analysis was composed of two main steps. The first step of analysis consisted of defining 
a chronology of events, followed by the identification of most influential episodes on 
coordination by relying on Miles and Huberman’s guidelines for Critical Incident Charts (p. 
115). According to these authors the Critical Incident Chart helps comparing different events 
that took place in a limited amount of time. The Criticial Incident Chart we used in presented 
in Appendice C.The second step of analysis consisted of analyzing the performative side of 
crisis response by repeatedly coding data, writing memos and then confronted our coding to 
theory. Appendice D presents an segment of the empirical coding of data. In the appendice 
the four codes that fit into the concept of performance are represented in bolt. 
The 2003 French heat wave crisis response 
The heat wave, which occurred during the summer of 2003 in Europe, had dramatic effects on 
the environment and the population and was described as a “long and deadly climatic 
episode, in particular for the weakest persons” (Evin, 2004 #1517). During the months of 
July and August, there was a spectacular drought. Lakes and rivers were dried-up enough to 
block energy supplying (Salagnac, 2007). The simultaneous effects of the heat and the 
drought raised the risk of fires and energy blackouts in electrical and nuclear power plants. 
The heat wave provoked 70000 fatalities in Europe. In France, the Parisian region was one of 
the most critically touched by the effects of the heat. 
In addition, 14802 persons died of hyperthermia between 1 and 20 August 2003. The 
number of fatalities caused by the heat wave was the highest among European countries after 
Italy. The elderlies represented more than 80% of the fatalities (Hémon, Jougla, Clavel, 
Laurent, Bellec and Pavillon, 2003). With the mortality rates being more than 150% higher 
than previous years during the two first weeks on the month of August (Hémon et al., 2003; 
Fouillet, Rey, Laurent, Pavillon, Bellec, Guihenneuc-Jouyaux, Clavel, Jougla and Hémon, 
2006), both health and civil protection were deeply disorganized.. Hospitals fall short of fresh 
water, ice, hydrating solutions, and other equipments. Mortuary chambers rapidly went full 
and hospitals had to find places to stock dead bodies. In addition, physicians hardly managed 
to diagnose hyperthermia at the beginning of the crisis. As a result, operationals literally 
experienced chaos and panic, due to the overwhelming number of patients who were 
inexorably dying. 
Hospitals were not the only type of organizations that were hit by the heat wave. More 
specifically, the 2003 French heat wave crisis response involved a complex set of 60 
organizations (with 23 different types of organizations) that we label here in as the Health 
Network. In this section, we first provide a short chronology of the events that composed the 
French heat wave crisis response. We then detail the paradoxes inherent to the transmission of 
information and requests within the Health Network. 
The first stage of the crisis situation corresponds to the emergence of disparate signals 
from 4 August to 7 August 2003. Emergency organizations and sanitary institutions in 
Brittany reported suspicious deaths to the heads of the Institut National de Veille Sanitaire 
(National Institute for Health Watch, labeled INVS) and the Direction Générale de la Santé 
(Health General Direction, labeled DGS), which are two national institutions in charge of 
watching and addressing sanitary risks. Thursday morning (6 August 2003), one of the Health 
ministry’s advisers requested the creation of an alert message to health professionals. The day 
before, local institutions had informally met emergency squad members, who had voiced their 
concerns about the potential effects of the heat on the elderlies. After the simultaneous 
appearance of alarming signals, the situation rapidly worsened, which corresponds to the 
beginning of the coping stage of the French heat wave crisis. On 8 August, health care 
operational services had to cope with the sudden rise of mortality. Health care operational 
 8 
actors became overwhelmed with the lack of resources. The Assistance Publique des 
Hôpitaux de Paris (Public assistance of Paris hospitals, labeled AP-HP) sent an alert asking 
the hospital staff to help each other with patients and get prepared if the “White Plan” was on 
the scene (The “White Plan” is the name of the national emergency plan that was developed 
by the French Health Ministry to organize the response of all official entities (police, fire 
brigades, hospitals, army, etc.) to face the heat wave). In the afternoon of 8 August, all the 
emergency squads (also called SAMU-SMUR) were overwhelmed with patients and requests. 
During the weekend, the situation worsened even more for all emergency squads: emergency 
units in hospitals, SAMU and SMUR, firefighters, as well as a non profit organization called 
SOS médecins. During the weekend many field actors developed improvisation practices, 
ranging from the ad hoc information system between firefighters and SAMU to innovative 
uses of ice in hospitals. On 10 August, Dr. A, an Emergency Room Technician (ERT), alerted 
the public opinion on television by asserting that deaths were numerous. On 11 August, the 
administrative sphere recognized that the situation is out of control. As the catastrophe was 
taking place, panic strengthened. None of the organizations involved in crisis response had a 
precise idea of the number of deaths, which resulted into speculation with the media as well 
as a political debate on the government ability to handle the situation. The hospital’s staff was 
exhausted by the heat and the lack of human and material resources. Transversal meetings 
between the Direction de l’Hospitalisation et de l’Organisation des Soins (Treatments 
organization and Hospitalization Direction, labeled as DHOS), DGS, AP-HP, INVS and 
Health Ministry advisers took place on 11 and 12 August 2003. 
The coping stage of the crisis was succeded by a post-crisis stage, which corresponded to 
the rise of conflicts within the Health Network. Since the afternoon of 13 August, the 
situation significantly improved in hospitals; the temperatures and the attendance of 
emergency services simultaneously decreased. However, the administrative sphere was 
settling into heavy data collection processes on the hospitals’ activities, which required hour-
per-hour reports from services in critical situations about patients, deaths and temperatures in 
rooms. In the afternoon the Internal Affairs Ministry officially triggered the “White Plan”. 
From this time on, the effort to compile statistics of death rates start and the political 
controversy surrounding the government’s ability to handle the situation developed. This time 
corresponded to the end of the organizational crisis but the beginning of a political crisis. 
While one can expect a linear relationship between information transmission and 
uncertainty, the 2003 French heat wave case offers puzzling illustrations of either successful 
or flawed coordination. Similarly to the Mann Gulch disaster case, crisis responders hardly 
coordinated while they were provided unambiguous instructions. In addition, they failed at 
developing a unified view on univocal matters such as statistics on mortality. On the contrary, 
when the situation was the most complicated or confusing, they surprisingly coordinated in an 
extemporaneous manner or even developed innovative practices collectively. In a short 
notice, hospitals’ personnel managed to develop and share good practices in relation to 
hyperthermia. In the following section we provide further detail and analyze these paradoxes 
by relying on performative thinking. 
The performative aspects of the 2003 French heat wave crisis response 
This section analyzes the performative dimension of five episodes of the 2003 French heat 
wave crisis response. Each of these episodes depicts information transmission between crisis 
responders through diverse media, such as official statement, press release, electronic 
communication, fax or face-to-face and phone interactions. As described in the 
methodological section (for more detail see the Critical Incident Chart in the Appendices), 
these episodes had a significant influence on crisis response and its outcome. Table 1 
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describes the transmitted information, the initial senders and recipients. We then detail our 
performative understanding of each episode. 
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Table 1. Description of the 2003 French heat wave episodes 
Episode label Date Transmitted information Initial 
sender 
Initial recipient 
An invitation 
for a memo 
6 August 
2003 
Request for an alert 
memo towards health care 
professionals 
Health 
Minister 
adviser 
Administrative 
managers 
An empathic 
warning 
8 August & 
12 August 
2003 
Warning about the 
situation and 
recommendations in a fax 
AP-HP 
directors 
Operationals 
A desperate 
bid for help 
8 August 
2003 
Request for help in 
Emergency Rooms (ER) 
ERT Administrative 
managers 
Disputing 
legitimacy 
10 August & 
11 August 
2003 
Alert about the number of 
fatalities 
ERT DGS director 
Informing 
about what 
remains 
unknown 
Between 10 
& 20 August 
2003 
Suggestion of a lack of 
information 
DGS 
assistant 
director 
Public opinion 
An invitation for a memo 
The top directors of the health network not only transmitted top-down requests but also 
performed so as to soften the strictness of their requests. Rather than claiming orders, they 
suggested actions and discussed the feasibility of these requests. 
In particular, on 6 August 2003, one of the Health Minister advisers explained to his 
counterparts his concern about the effect of the heat on citizens’ health. Using electronic 
communication, he suggested to administrative managers – his subordinates - the need to send 
a recommendation memo about hyperthermia to health care organizations and professionals. 
Rather than explicitely expressing the urgent need for the memo, he formulated a friendly 
suggestion that did not sound neither compulsory nor necessary. Using both conditional 
verbal mode and email as an asynchronous, therefore less abrupt channel, the adviser’s tone 
remained gracious: 
“It would be useful to send a memo to recall basic precautions to care for the youngest 
and eldest patients. There are plenty of studies about the health related impacts of heat waves 
(…). I think the CDC [Center for Disease Control in Atlanta] reviewed them. It could result 
into an emergency message”. 
The performance of the adviser as a soft and corteous superior hindered the gravity of the 
events that originally motivated his request. Rather than the heat, the request itself attracted 
the attention of the recipients, who, in turn, reflected about what could be completed with 
respect to the memo. In their email responses, the administrative managers performed as 
zealous professionals: 
“I called [colleagues] to discuss about what could be done [to investigate the health 
related impacts of the heat wave]. First of all, we should take into account the feasibility 
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criterion. We therefore should collaborate with organizations that already have an 
information system and data from previous years. Here is our idea: trying to bring 
information up to the INVS rather than settling for a specific data collection system”. 
However, showing their involvement into the design of future investigation conducted 
them to delay their initial task: writing an emergency message. Emails were forwarded 
multiple times and developed a narration of the actions undertaken since the sending of the 
original email. Their content was of the strategic level, dealing with feasibility as a generic 
criterion to make decision on whether the strategy should be implemented. However, the 
interlocutors did not include details on how to implement the strategy. 
Eventually, more than 60 hours were necessary to produce a final version of the memo. 
This means that the actions in response to this request were completed in three days, a delay 
too extended given the urgency of the situation and the need for an alert. It is interesting to 
note that the plans for investigation were not fully implemented, even in the aftermath of the 
heat wave. 
In this episode, information was transmitted satisfactorily: emails were promptly 
exchanged by the individuals involved in the production of the memo. In addition, the episode 
does not reveal any hiatus between the crisis responders’ interpretation of the situation. 
However, the delayed realization of the memo highlights that interactions, performed as a 
professional courteoisy, generated enthusiasm but not necessarily immediate action. Both the 
sender and the recipients. They commited into intense questioning but primarily experienced 
a professional transaction rather than addressing the gravity of the situation itself. While the 
intent of the message was to alert, it performatively carried the opposite sense: there is no 
emergency. 
An empathic warning 
Emotional discourse performed as both a lever for resources and a strong motivator. The 
AP-HP directors spontaneously sent a fax on 8 August to transmit guidelines to hospitals. 
These directions mentioned the need to alleviate the workload of emergency units, by sending 
the patients whose health was satisfactorily to their homes and canceling previously planned 
surgical operations. The AP-HP co-director, who was the author of this fax, wrote a personal 
comment next to the guidelines. In this comment, he expressed his awareness and concern 
that hospitals were being overwhelmed by challenges: 
“The situation is very alarming. I insist that everyone take all the necessary initiatives as 
soon as you get this message. I am aware that the situation is complicated”. 
While the comment is alarming, the fax generated strong involvement and mobilization 
among operationals. Similarly, the DHOS director sent a fax on 12 August recommending 
that hospitals should be open to “consider every opportunity to increase beds capacities, even 
by collaborating with funeral homes”. In other words, the director gave permission to hospital 
directors to improvise ad hoc solutions to manage corpses. The senders of these faxes were 
then struck by the responses to their warning: 
“What is wonderful in our institution is that people respond immediately to our messages. 
In a fax I wrote by pen to people that the situation was alarming and that they had to get 
prepared for it. In the hours following my sending of the message, people were mobilized to 
do extra-hours, find beds and other resources”. 
In this case, information transmission was not totally effective. Interestingly, the 
directions provided in the fax were not exhaustive and did not include details on how to make 
them practically feasible. In addition, this fax message was a one-shot, unidirectional 
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communication. As sender and the recipients did not have the opportunity to confront their 
interpretations of the situation, the emergence of a collective sensemaking was difficult, if not 
impossible. 
However, with the personal view of the sender added on the side of the document, the fax 
was not only a media but also supported the sender’s performance as an empathic, almost 
fraternal leader. By explaining his awareness of the situation, the sender hinted his personal 
involvement into the situation. Through the first person narration and the expression of his 
own opinion, the AP-HP director incarnated rather than merely vehicled information. His 
comment suggested that the recipients were the “real” actors on the stage of the crisis 
response. According to the message, the operationals were meant to be in the field, feel self-
confident and act accordingly to their understanding of the situation and improvise. As a 
result, the message had an empowering effect on operationals who massively commited 
during the 8-10 August weekend by doing extra hours, coming back from vacation or even 
practicing innovatively. 
Such personal involvement and understanding from the author had a positive catalyst effect. 
The message neither really transmitted information nor supported common sensemaking. Its 
intention was before all to affect and have effects. Instead of providing directions, it 
performatively conveyed: find the relevant directions. The unusual phrases and tones were 
interpreted as ‘there is something really unusual’.  
A desperate bid for help 
Later, on 10 August, the situation was more than ever critical and crisis responders kept 
sending messages and communicating. While messages were alarming, administrative 
managers surprisingly generated rather neutral and detached answers. More than that, they 
failed to trigger any reaction. 
In particular, an ERT contacted one of the DGS employees on 11 August. His email vividly 
depicted his feeling powerless to tackle deaths and suffering: 
“Many elderly die in emergency rooms indirectly or directly from hyperthermia. Three 
persons died in Saint Joseph [hospital] so far. The emergency roomers (ERs), at least ours, 
are totally flooded with patients. Some of them stay 4 or 5 on the same stretchers in ER. We 
have to search for more beds and have completely deleted all our scheduled medical 
interventions. I have never experienced such a situation in 25 years. The situation is really 
serious”. 
Through this message, the ERT performed as a reporter and literally shared his own field 
experience. He did not only provided a rich description of what he was witnessing but also 
accounted for his concern. However, his message failed at developing a shared perception of 
the situation. His administrative interlocutor reformulated his request as a transmission of 
information and did not respond to the ERT’s opinion on the criticality of the situation. His 
response did not include any personal reaction to the description of the suffering and his tone 
remained neutral. Rather, he accounted for forms as management tools to be used in hospitals: 
“Thank you for the information you transmitted earlier about heat strokes in Saint Joseph 
and Bichat hospitals. I relayed it internally. The InVS has just settled an emergency data 
collection process. Please find attached the forms that compose it. All these documents have 
been sent to hospitals. The person to contact is….”. 
Despite the ERT’s personal involvement into the alerting message, his performance did not 
mobilize nor federated his interlocutors. Responding again, the ERT’s response unveiled 
statistics issues related to data collection and further argued the need for help: 
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“Thanks for your message. We have sent messages everywhere. The problem with data is that 
they will not reflect indirect effects of hyperthermia (…). The situation is desperate here. The 
government or the DRASS should trigger the White Plan or an Emergency plan very quickly. 
As I made my promise to your colleague, could you please transfer information?” 
With no surprise the administrative interlocutor effectively transmitted the email but no 
discussion was developed on data collection. It is interesting to note the email response to the 
ERT who had alerted administrative actors focused on a long term investigation project rather 
than immediate action: 
“Thank you for information. Beyond the current investigation we intend to lead a long term 
investigation on the total mortality – or even morbidity – that will take into account some 
specific pathologies, such as cardiac, vascular, and respiratory diseases. Our project has to 
be validated but we hope that an international comparison will be feasible”. 
In this episode, information transmission was effective and quick. However, a common 
sensemaking of the situation hardly developed, which, in our view, is related to the 
interlocutors’ distinct performances. The ERT and his admnistrative colleague performed on 
distinct stages, thereby failing at sharing one unique meaning. While the ERT’s alert 
grounded on a emotional even physical experience of the catastrophe, the administrative 
managers, in turn, performed on a theoretical stage. In addition, they focused on the objective 
to transmit information where as the ERT used information transmission as means to 
mobilize. The ERT’s performance was disconnected to adminstrative usages. Emotions and 
embodiement cannot be filled in a form. The administrative ‘spectator’ made his own 
interpretation of the ERT’s performance, which was far from the intented message. 
Disputing legitimacy 
During the whole crisis response, actors failed to develop convergent views on univocal 
matters, such as statistics. Conflicting viewpoints and even arguments, arrose amoung 
professionals when compiling data on  the number of deaths and fatalities due to the heat. As 
soon as alerts were raised, operational and administrative actors started debating a correct 
estimation of fatalities. To lead this debate, both actors approached their own mise en scène 
by using rhetoric that is specific to their professions. Operational actors relied on the dramatic 
vision of hospitals and patients waiting for care and provided a vivid testimony of the 
catastrophe they were witnessing. In addition, they unsettled those who were unaware 
situation’s severity  by unexpectedly breaking the silence about the mortality figures. 
Dr. A, an ERT who had developed numerous acquaintances through the health network and 
the media, had the initiative to contact one of the top directors by phone when the number of 
patients became alarming in his unit. On 10 August, he appeared on television during prime 
time. He was interviewed in the middle of an emergency room and dressed in a  suit. In 
addition to the visual effect provided by the interview settings, Dr. A announced that more 
than 50 deaths could be expected and that emergency units were overwhelmed with patients, 
which had a striking effect on public opinion. This was the first time that death figures were 
mentioned in relation to the heat wave. The officials reacted to this interview the day after by 
positing in an official note that these 50 deaths were not unexpected but resulted from natural 
causes. The officials’ statement stated that the elderly who had passed away during the first 
days of the heat wave would have passed away anyways.  
Dr A. then reacted on August ll, 2003 to this official statement in another interview, claiming: 
“No, these deaths [were] not normal and these elderly people would not have passed away 
now” and concluded with dismay: “And what about all these persons?”, showing the patients 
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who were waiting in the ER, “Should we let them die without doing anything? What the hell 
are they doing at the DGS? Is this a joke?” 
On 11 August, Dr. A was invited by the government to attend an ad hoc meeting and to 
provide his recommendations on what should be done to alleviate the immense workload 
hospitals were facing (for more detail see the chronology of the heat wave). At the end of this 
meeting Dr. A met the director of the DGS, e.g., the institution he openly criticized during his 
two interviews: 
“At the top of the stairs, I can see a man with messy hair […]. This man is the DGS director.  
He is an epidemiologist, an internationally approved specialist of high sanitary risks. He 
teaches worlwide, primarily in France and Canada. Although he was away when the crisis 
broke out, he is now back in Paris, just like the other directors. (…). I have neither met [this 
person]. However, as soon as he sees me, he starts talking to me as if we were friends. This 
does not surprise me: Even though we are not relatives, we are least colleagues. Despite the 
fact that we belong to distinctly different professional families, he calls to me: “So. Dr.A., you 
are babbling on, let me teach you what a real statistical curve is! You have some lessons to 
learn on epidemiology!” 
In this episode, information transmission was not totally effective as the interlocutors 
interacted undirectely, e.g. through press releases, official statements and interviews. In 
addition, sensemaking developed on separate tracks for each side. The divergent views on 
mortality statistics eventually resulted into a professional duel between Dr. A and the DGS 
director. Both Dr. A and the administration used specific communication means: the former 
relied on an emotional mediatic representation while the latter performed legitimacy, referring 
to either status in the case of the press release or knowledgeability in the case of the DGS 
director. One after another, each performance was eventually dismantled by a contradictory 
performance from the other side.  
While Dr. A’s intention was to alert that the situation was needed immediate attention, the 
statement and the DGS director’s language hinted that the situation was unsurprising. Thanks 
to his initial performance, Dr. A provoked a reaction from the officials that eventually 
resulted in a salutary outcome. However, this conflictual performance made assessing 
fatalities even more emotional and complicated. Unfortunately, the original topic of interests 
was significantly hindered by the debates over figure. Consequently, additional chaos and 
noise were generated at the expense of an immediate response.  
This example reveals how a performance can cause confusion, while at the same time serving 
as a powerful catalyst for response. People not only react to a situation, they also perform a 
role depending on their position and disposition. If one improvises an action which contrasts 
those expected from their peers and supervisors, the performance may generate a reaction 
questioning the legitimacy of the improvisers. Conflicts may then arise, preventing the 
development of a unified interpretation of the situation. However, this conflictual 
performance may also instigate a response that is critically necessary. 
Informing about what remains unknown 
As the crisis response was unfolding, responsibilities were increasingly questioned by 
operationals, trade unions and the media. Between 4 and 20 August, crisis responders 
developed a growing concern towards their own understanding of the situation. Day after day, 
both administrative and operational actors realized that the social implications of the heat 
wave were much worse than what was officially stated. Consequently, some administrative 
directors felt the need to develop communication strategies to protect themselves against  
potential criticism. Since 10 August, directors started sending messages, similar to that of the 
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communiqué, that explained how unexpected the situation was and that the lack of available 
information was likely to burden their handling of the situation: 
“During the past week, we were informed of unexpected deaths that have occurred since the 
first days of the heat wave. We will certainly have a full assessment of the situation by the end 
of the month of September. However, it is likely that the mortality rates will be high: certainly 
hundreds of deaths, unfortunately”. 
At this point of the crisis response, the message did not bring forth any additional pieces of 
information to infirm or confirm previously held assumptions. Arguably the sender of this 
message seemingly anticipated future problems in crisis response that could be associated 
with his position. He therefore accounted for his future lack of performance by incriminating 
the lack of information. By doing so, he performed as a consciencious foresighter who, 
powerless, could not, under any condition, work efficiently. By sending this message, the 
director unavoidably experienced crisis as a powerless spectator. In particular, the message 
focused on figures and facts, implying limited emotional commitment. Such a communication 
strategy was unsurprising given that the risk of being compelled to account for one’s behavior 
and responsibilities is high within the health care profession. However, this message 
suggested the sender’s intention was to not be held responsible for the situation and implied 
his disengagement from the reality of the crisis. A performance is not always directed towards 
an efficient action; a performance is primarily directed towards those who examines 
performance taking into account the performances of those for whom they are held 
accountable for. 
Table 2. presents a summary of our findings. For each episode, the table details three specific 
points. The first is labeled Sensemaking and refers to whether a common meaning was shared 
at the end of an episode. The second point refers to whether information transmission was 
effective. The final point in the table is labeled as Performance features and corresponds to 
the salient characteristics of the performances that took place during each episode. 
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Table 2. Coordination and Performative aspects of communication during the 2003 French 
heat wave episodes 
Episode 
label 
Date Communication features Effects on 
crisis response 
An 
invitation 
for a memo 
6 
August 
Sensemaking Shared meaning Mobilization 
and 
involvement but 
delayed 
completion of 
tasks 
Information transmission 
& access 
effective 
Performance features Courteoisy & 
professional zeal 
An 
empathic 
warning  
8 and 
12 
August 
Sensemaking Unshared meaning Mobilization ad 
involvement. 
Immediate 
action and 
involvement 
Information transmission 
& access 
Ineffective 
Performance features Empathy & 
empowerment 
A 
desperate 
bid for help 
8 
August 
Sensemaking Unshared meaning Mobilization 
but 
detachement. 
No immediate 
action 
Information access & 
transmission 
Effective 
Performance features Emotion & 
professionalism 
regarding 
information 
transmission 
Disputing 
legitimacy 
10 and 
11 
August 
Sensemaking Unshared meaning Immediate 
action but 
conflicts and 
confusion. 
Information access & 
transmission 
Ineffective 
Performance features Emotion, visual 
representation and 
knowledgeability 
Informing 
about what 
remains 
unknown 
6-20 
August 
Sensemaking Shared meaning Delayed action 
Information transmission Effective 
Performance features Professionalism 
Discussion 
Approaching crisis response trough the concept of performativity is complementary to other 
more traditional approaches in crisis management literature. 
While crisis reponders to the 2003 French heat wave failed at communicating efficiently on 
univocal matters, they paradoxically managed to handle chaos collectively, in particular in the 
second and the forth episodes. This paradox is not a surprise as previous work in crisis 
management literature already demonstrated that information transmission is fragile and 
primarily depends on crisis responders’ perceptions and behaviors (Weick, 1993; Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2001; Laroche, 2004; Rodriguez, Trainor and Quarantelli, 2006). 
By using performativity as an analysis grid, this work sheds light on this paradox and 
highlights the influence of communication strategies coordination in crisis response in three 
manners. 
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First, the performative perspective provides additional insights on mobilization and 
involvement. This perspective gives insight on how to account for collective action in crisis 
response when efficient information transmission and shared sensemaking do not occur. In 
addition, performativity can account for delayed action despite optimized information 
transmission and shared sensemaking. For instance, in his invitation to write a memo, the 
Health Minister adviser softened the strictness of his orders. His subordinates, in turn, 
struggled to prove their professionalism by extensive email communication, thereby delaying 
the completion of the requested task. Analyzing how the subordinates took into account the 
decision maker’s performance and consequently performed helps understand how an urgent 
request paradoxically took days to be completed, e.g. generated mobilization but low 
awareness at the same time. Consistently with this view, acknowledging the performative 
dimension of communication helps to avoid misleading conclusions on crisis responders’ 
reaction to an information stimulus. Going further, the perspective on performance helps 
understand why interpretations of a message may even contradict what its content was meant 
to convey.  
Second, approaching crisis response through performativity enriches the analysis of a case 
study by taking into account emotion and not only cognition or words. emotional tone of the 
message in the second episode triggered massive involvement from the hospitals’ personnel. 
On the contrary, the ERT to his administrative interlocutor was less effective in the third 
episode. In the former case, the performance of emotions had a federating effect on crisis 
responders while in the latter it arose misunderstandings. For this reason, further investigation 
is necessary to explain the contrast between these two episodes where crisis responders 
performed their emotions. 
Third, the concept of performativity highlights that crisis responders can endorse two distinct 
roles alternatively: as actors and as spectators This duality reveals contradiction as a core 
ingredients of communication during crisis response, as previously suggested in the literature 
(Quarantelli, 1954; Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). As performers and spectators are likely not 
to share the same experience of a play, crisis responders experience crisis response from 
separate perspectives. Thus crisis responders are likely to interpret other’s actions on the basis 
of their own performance. As the disputing legitimacy episode suggests, crisis responders 
argued their knowledgeability to counter competing meanings and performances, which 
contributed to the coexistence of multiple meanings. As performers and spectators are likely 
not to share the same experience of a play, crisis responders experience crisis response from 
separate perspectives. Thus crisis responders are likely to interpret other’s actions on the basis 
of their own performance. As the disputing legitimacy episode suggests, crisis responders 
argued their knowledgeability to counter competing meanings and performances, which 
contributed to the coexistence of multiple meanings. 
Finally, performativity highlights the role of a power in coordination in crisis response. In 
particular, the third and the fourth episodes reveal that power connection between crisis 
responders are embodied by technology, places and even objects. In particular, crisis 
responders’ choice for a media or a place to exchange information is likely to impact 
coordination. In fact, staging, role-playing and power games were at the core of the disputing 
legitimacy episode. In the same vein, the last episode suggests that choosing an asynchronous 
technology to send communiqué can be seen as a strategy to avoid face-to-face interaction 
and protect from the crisis responders’ questioning. In addition, this perspective also suggests 
that conflicting performance can contribute the absence of shared meaning but be engines for 
action and coordination, while a consensual performance can promote organizational inertia. 
Performance is thus linked not only to sensemaking but also to accountability. 
Contribution  
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This study applies a performative perspective to a specific crisis situation in an exploratory 
manner. Previous studies have taken into account the performativity of groups of individuals 
involved in critical situations, such as political leaders (Boin, t Hart and McConnell, 2008; 
Hajer and Uitermark, 2008) and experts (Boudes and Laroche, 2009). However, 
performativity has been rarely used as an overall perspective on coordination in crisis 
response. Thriving to develop an original application of the concept of performativity in 
critical contexts, this paper contributes in three manners to crisis management literature. 
First, this study presents performativity as a valuable concept to account for coordination in 
crisis response. By doing so, we enrich the crisis management literature by enlarging the 
spectrum of variables usually considered to analyze collective phenomena such as interactions 
and coordination. In addition, our work exposes the role that a performance can play in the 
manipulation of information, the emergence of sensemaking. and coordination. On a more 
theoretical perspective, the performative dimension is based on a richer and more complex 
concept of sense, and is in search of movement rather of organizational stability. Therefore a 
performance may lead to increased instability This bring to the front the question of what 
makes a the felicity of a performance. Performance fuels on ongoing interactions, actions as 
well as crisis responders’ personal myths and emotions. For this reason, one could safely 
assume that performance is a situated concept, whose dynamic depends on multiple 
contextual variables, such as hierarchy, organizational culture. Further investigation is 
necessary to understand how this variables can influence performance among crisis 
responders. 
The second contribution of this work is directed towards managers. Our findings highlight 
both positive and negative effects of performing on sensemaking and coordination. While the 
first episode suggests that the adviser’s performance diluted the sense of emergency, the 
second episode reveals that directors’ expression of their personal emotion had a positive 
effect on crisis responders’ involvement.  For this reason, we believe that managing crisis 
responders’ performance can be an additional resource to prepare and train for crisis response. 
Thus, we propose that organizations train potential crisis responders train to develop know-
hows with respect to performance in a critical setting. Inspiring from acting techniques to 
propose training session to professionals would be a manner to do so, as numerous 
organizations did to support improvisational capaibilities. In particular, we view the teaching 
of techniques to switch between the perspectives of an actor and a spectator during a crisis 
response would help avoid misunderstandings and coordination in crisis response. For 
example, we suggest that crisis responders train to jump from one role to another in a crisis 
simulation to take some distance with their emotions and behaviors. By doing so, crisis 
responders can improve interactions, detect wether their interlocutors are performig a specific 
role and mutually share their experience in a debriefing session. In addition, identifiying a 
repertoire of potential roles played in crisis response can be useful to support the emergence 
of informal leadership when needed. 
As another contribution, the paper questions three tacilty accepted assumptions in the crisis 
management field. 
First, we challenge an implicit but widely shared tenet that crisis response rests on crisis 
responders’ ability to eventually overcome cognitive obstacles. A majority of studies account 
for crisis responders’ efforts either to share a unified interpretation of the situation, either to 
defend their own meaning (‘T Hart, Tindall and Brown, 2009). Ambiguity fuels sensemaking 
in crisis response (Landgren, 2005) and interactions on multiple meanings is essential to 
support organizational cohesion. However, the third episode reveals that a persistant chaos 
during the 2003 French heat wave did not prevent efficient coordination and mobilization, 
which has two main implications. First, the persistence of multiple and divergent meanings is 
not always something to avoid. Second, performing emotions such as empathy or anger, can 
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generate chaos even more but also instigate essential reactions from crisis responders. On the 
contrary, the last episode demonstrates that shared meaning was not always associated with 
immediate action and commitment. In sum, among the five episodes presented here in four 
show that actors faced overwhelming cognitive obstacles. Yet, they managed to develop ad 
hoc coordination and save lives, depending on the mutual effects of each performance on the 
others. More than being a question of being able (or not) to interpret a situation propertly, 
crisis responders’ action strongly depends on their own performance of emotions and 
professional values, as well as their perception of others’ performance. 
Second, our work reveals that a performance can have a prominent role on the outcome of 
interactions between crisis responders. Even though organizations seek to optimize access to 
information and support collective awareness, an organization’s likeliness to handle a crisis 
responders still remains dependant on unanticipable, transformative  and uncontrollable 
variables such as performances. For this reason, our work raises a double alert. Not only 
important investments devoted to crisis management are limited. In addition, a mechanistic 
understanding of interactions and coordination that overlooks the performative dimension of 
crisis response is misleading. Nowadays, a majority of studies in crisis management field 
strives to provide additional resources or guidelines, going from reliability analysis tools 
(Jackson, Sullivan Faith and Willis, 2011) to software systems (Netten and van Someren, 
2011). However, our findings suggest the limitations of these prescriptions to support crisis 
response. Our work, on the contrary, echoes previously held arguments with respect 
complexity of coordination (Argote, 1982; Comfort, Dunn, Johnson, Skertich and Zagorecki, 
2004; Comfort, Ko and Zagorecki, 2004). The performative understanding of the 2003 French 
heat wave crisis response demonstrates that coordination can be fragile and uncontrollable. 
The first episode depicts a situation where efficient information transmission did not have 
expected effects but generated organizational inertia. For this reason, does not result from 
information transmission solely but rather stem from an intricately related set of emotions, 
strategies and mise en scène. 
Finally, this work responds to Roux-Dufort’s call for further consideration of the conceptual 
ties between theory of crisis to organization science in general (2007). Traditional thinking in 
crisis management views crisis as an exceptional event, generating alternative behaviors 
(Milburn, Schuler and Watman, 1983a; Milburn et al., 1983b) and coordination patterns 
(Smart and Vertinsky, 1977;1984). On the contrary, our work suggests that, crisis or not, 
individuals remain both performers and spectators in the organizational arena. While one 
could safly assume that crisis responders act wisely and put aside their own interests to focus 
on victims, the empirical reality suggests that even when a crisis obviously demands 
adaptation and specific behaviors from individuals involved in it, crisis responders still follow 
individualistic patterns. from this standpoint, crisis management is not a management of 
exceptions. 
Despite all our efforts, our analysis of the case study presented herein presents some 
limitations. We focus here on a specific crisis case, which could harldy support 
generalization. Lastly, the concept of performance still needs to be further conceptualized. It 
is coined as an “essentially contested concept” (Strine, Long and Hopkins, 1990; Madison and 
Hamera, 2005), in that it has several competing meanings and framings that all contribute to 
its productivity (Goffman, 1970; Giroux, 2006). 
Conclusion 
This paper draws on the concept of performativity to provide additional insights on 
information transmission in crisis response and challenge three tacitly accepted assumption in 
crisis management literature. Our findings suggest that crisis responders’ performance 
profoundly influencedcoordination. In particular, it generated multiplicity of perceptions and 
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meanings. In addition, it played an ambivalent role on mobilization and involvement. It helps 
to better take into account emotions and affects, embobiment, staging and role-playing, 
divergence of interpretation and absence of shared meaning in responses to crises. In our 
view, the crisis management literature would benefit from a more extensive use of 
performativity. 
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Appendices 
Appendice A: An illustration of data triangulation 
While the Health Ministry advisers claimed that they had no idea of the gravity of the 
situation before 11 August. The emails that were exchanged and received on 7 and 8 August 
reveal that one of these advisors had recommended that the DGS issue an emergency 
message about the effect of hyperthermia. This interaction was evidenced in external 
archives as well. First, the Evin Report mentions that the AP-HP called one of the Health 
Ministry advisers on 7 August (2004: , p. 97). Furthermore, Patrick Pelloux depicted in his 
essay his preliminary warnings to the Health Minister at the beginning of the month of 
August (2004). 
 
Appendice B: Theme dictionaries for data reduction 
Organizational crisis theme dictionary 
Subtheme Definition 
Complexity The extent to which the outcome of the interaction or the interaction itself 
depends on other interactions or events. 
Uncertainty  The extent to which the present situation was unanticipated (defines the 
concept of surprise that characterizes crisis) and the extent to which the 
future is difficult to anticipate., (in particular when it comes to the outcome 
of the interaction) 
Triggering event The first signal that starts the crisis response. 
Emotional Pressure The extent to which the situation is stressing participants.  
Time pressure The extent to which cannot take their time to interact 
Contradiction The situation is perceived as contradictory for the participants 
Rigidity threats Describes the organization’s tendency to urge and strengthen preplanned 
procedures in reaction to crisis (staw et al., 1981). It may questions the 
organizational ability to improvise or, on the contrary, stimulated 
improvisation 
Centralization Describes the organization’s tendency not to delegate and centralize power 
(Smart and Vertinsky, 1977) 
Entropy Defines a disequilibrium in terms of energy that individuals spent to achieve 
their tasks (Katz, Kahn, 1966; Morin, 1977) 
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Organizational structures and functioning theme dictionary 
Subtheme Definition 
Hierarchy Describes the formal distribution of power and responsibilities within 
organization 
Organization 
mission Defines the primary organizational raison d’être. 
Organizational 
culture 
Describes the major values that exist in regards to work, workers and 
organizational functioning (Martin, 1992) 
Technological 
infrastructure 
Describes the hardware resources, software resources and competencies 
(Byrd, Turner, 2000) 
Location The geographical locations of an organization. 
Interorganizational 
Connections 
Determines entities the organization connects to (both in routine and crisis 
situations) 
Sub systems Describes the sub parts of the organization. 
Communities of 
practice 
Defines the professional group that gathers individuals having common 
interests and practices (Wenger, 1989) 
 
Individual characteristics theme dictionary 
Sub-Theme Definition 
Reactivity Describes the personal ability to react to events or to provide help to co-
workers. 
Professional Values 
and expectations 
Personal expectations in regard to professional activities and professional 
values in general. Depends on the individual’s status in the organization. 
Reference group The set of people the participant perceives as belonging to his or her work 
environment that defines the social world of work in which he or she 
engages (Lawrence, 2006) 
Crisis experience The personal or professional experience of crisis and emergency situations. 
Crisis response 
participation The willingness or the ability to participate into crisis response.  
Collaboration Describes the personal experience of collaboration and values in respect to 
cooperation 
Cooperation Describes the personal experience with previous collaboration and personal 
values that are related to cooperation. 
Personal experience 
of the heat wave 
The extent to which the participant suffered from Heat Wave outside his or 
her professional activities. Accounts for a deep emotional experience of heat 
wave 
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Appendice C: Critical Incident Chart 
Date Events 
4 August 2003 Alerts from DDASS 56 
5 August 2003 Various alerts 
6 August 2003 Request for the production of a memo from the DGS (*). 
7 August 2003 Alerts from Parisian hospitals and SAMU with respect to 
resources shortages: beds. 
Settling of a monitoring cell of Parisian public and private hospitals 
8 August 2003 Email alerts and requests from a Parisian ERT (*). 
Settling of a crisis cell within the AP-HP 
The AP-HP a public message comprised of guidelines to follow 
to alleviate the side effects of the heat 
Completion of the memo – that will be sent on Friday evening (*). 
9 August 2003 Claim of shortages of resources and overwhelmed mortuary 
chambers 
10 August 2003 Dr. A’s interview on television 
Directors’ press release 
11 August 2003 A national crisis meeting between civil protection and health 
care organizations takes place. Dr. A is among the participants. 
At the end of the meeting, he has an opened argument with the 
DGS director. 
12 August 2003 Message of Support from the DHOS director 
13 August 2003 Temperatures decrease. 
Official “Plan Blanc” is triggered. 
14 August 2003 The controversy with respect to statistics 
Legend Events in bolt had a catalyctic effect on crisis response. 
Events in italic triggered conflicts. 
(*): Events that were not followed by an immediate reaction. 
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Apprendice D: The emergence of the performative side of interactions between the 2003 
French heat wave crisis responders 
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Appendice E: Acronyms 
INVS: Institut de Veille Sanitaire 
AP-HP: Assistance Publique – Hôpitaux de Paris 
ERT: Emergeny Room Technician 
SAMU: Service d’Aide Médicale Urgente 
DGS: Direction Générale de la Santé 
